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BLACK V. VIRGINIA
553 S.E.2D 738 (VA. 2001)
FACTS
Defendant Barry Elton Black ("Black") burned a cross at a Ku Klux Klan
rally held on private property with the permission of the owner, following
speeches promoting racial, ethnic, and religious bigotry.' In a separate
incident, Richard J. Elliott ("Elliott") and Jonathan O'Mara ("O'Mara")
attempted to burn a cross in the backyard of an African-American neighbor,
James S. Jubilee ("Jubilee"), without permission.2 Elliott told people at a party
he was attending, that his neighbor, Jubilee, had complained about Elliott
discharging firearms in his own backyard.3 Elliott suggested they burn a cross
in Jubilee's yard in response.4 Elliott, O'Mara and the host of the party, David
Targee ("Targee") constructed a wooden cross in Targee's garage.5 Elliott
repeatedly referred to Jubilee with a racial epithet while transporting the cross
to Jubilee's home.6 According to trial testimony, Jubilee's race was clear to
all three individuals before they attempted to burn the cross.7 After arriving
at Jubilee's backyard, O'Mara put the cross in the ground and attempted to
light it.
8
The Commonwealth charged Black, Elliott, and O'Mara with violating Va.
Code § 18.2-423, which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of intimidating
any person or group of persons, to burn, or cause to be burned, a cross on the
property of another, a highway or other public place. Any person who shall
violate any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. Any
such burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to
intimidate a person or group of persons.9
Virginia's General Assembly enacted the cross burning statute in 1952 in
response to Ku Klux Klan activity throughout the state.'" The General
Assembly later amended the statute to prohibit cross burning in more
1. Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738, 740 (Va. 2001).







9. Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-423 (1999).
10. Black, 553 S.E.2d at 742.
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locations." The assembly also added that cross burning would e prima facie
evidence of intent to intimidate. 2
The trial court indicted Black for violating the cross burning statute, and
Black moved for dismissal of the indictment on the grounds that the statute
was unconstitutional. 3 The trial court denied Black's motion and a jury
convicted Black. 4 Black appealed his conviction and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 5
O'Mara pled guilty to attempted cross burning and conspiracy to commit
cross burning, pursuant to a plea agreement. Under the agreement, O'Mara
retained the right to appeal the constitutionality of Virginia's cross burning
statute. 6 The trial court found Elliott guilty of attempted cross burning.
Both defendants appealed, alleging that § 18.2-423 violated the free speech
clauses of both the United States and Virginia Constitutions.' 7 The Court of
Appeals affirmed the convictions, and held that the statute "targets only
expressive conduct undertaken with the intent to intimidate another, conduct
clearly proscribable both as fighting words and a threat of violence."'" The
Virginia Supreme Court consolidated these two cases on appeal. 9
HOLDING
The Supreme Court of Virginia, in a4-3 decision, struck down § 18.2-423,
the state law banning cross burning, stating that it violated the First
Amendment.20  The Court held that the law was facially unconstitutional
because it prohibited otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of its
content and that the statute was overbroad.2 ' The Court vacated the
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 741.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 740.
17. Id. at 741.
U.S. Const. amend. I, § 1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or ofthe press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.
V.A. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12. That the freedoms of speech and of the press are among the great bulwarks
of liberty, and can never be restrained except by despotic governments; that any citizen may freely speak,
write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; that the
General Assembly shall not pass any law abridging the freedom of speech or of the press, nor the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances.
18. O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 535 S.E.2d 175, 181 (2000).
19. Black, 553 S.E.2d at 741.
20. Id. at 746.
21. Id. at 740.
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defendants' convictions and dismissed the indictments.2
ANALYSIS.
Justice Lemons, writing for the court, stated that, "non-verbal, symbolic
expression is 'speech,' and is as fully protected by the First Amendment as
more traditional means of communications. ' 23 The Supreme Court of
Virginia's opinion compared the Virginia cross burning statute to the
Minnesota statute the United State Supreme Court found unconstitutional in
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul24 .25 That case concerned the prosecution of a
teenager who allegedly assembled a crudely made cross and burned the cross
inside the fenced yard of a black family.2 6 The City of St. Paul prosecuted
under its Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which states:
Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."
The United States Supreme Court held that, even if the expression reached
by the ordinance was proscribable under the "fighting words" doctrine, the
ordinance was "facially unconstitutional in that it prohibited otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."2
The Virginia Supreme Court held that the Virginia cross burning statute was
indistinguishable from the ordinance struck down in R.A. V29
Justice Lemons echoed the R.A. V. opinion, "the government may not
regulate use based upon hostility--or favoritism-- towards the underlying
message expressed."30  The court also found that the statute was
unconstitutional because "a statute that sweeps within its ambit both protected
and unprotected speech is overbroad."'" The opinion further emphasized the
22. Id. at 746.
23. Id. at 742.
24. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).





30. Id at 744.
31. Id.
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unconstitutionality of prohibiting speech on the basis of the subjects the speech
addresses, "Under our system of government, people have the right to use
symbols to communicate. They may patriotically wave the flag or burn it in
protest; they may reverently worship the cross or burn it as an expression of
bigotry."32
One of the majority's leading arguments for the unconstitutionality of
§ 18.2-423 was that the enhanced probability of prosecution under the statute
chilled the expression of protected speech sufficiently to render the statute
overbroad.33 The court found that the clause in § 18.2-423, that stated "any
burning of a cross shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a
person or group of persons," chilled free expression because a critical element
of the offense required no evidence other than a statutorily supplied
inference. 4 The Court stated that the act of burning a cross alone, with no
evidence of intent to intimidate, would nonetheless suffice for arrest and
prosecution and would insulate the Commonwealth from a motion to strike the
evidence at the end of its case-in-chief.35 This would result in arrest and
prosecution for otherwise protected speech, with no evidence for a critical
element of the offense other than an inference in the statute. 36 A statute
selectively addressed to the content of symbolic speech is not permitted under
the First Amendment because it inhibits free expression.37
DISSENTING OPINION
Justice Hassell dissented with Chief Justice Carrico and Justice Koontz.
The dissent focused on the use of the term intimidation in the statute, and
adopted the view that the First Amendment does not "permit a person to burn
a cross in a manner that intentionally places another person in fear of bodily
harm. '38 The dissent also found no foundation in the Constitution of Virginia
or the United States Constitution'that would prohibit the General Assembly
from enacting this statute.39
The dissent distinguished § 18.2-423 from the ordinance in R.A. V.40 The
opinion stated that the Virginia statute only prohibits the burning of a cross






38. Id. at 748.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 753.
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when such act is performed with the intent to intimidate. 4' The St. Paul
ordinance, however, targeted cross burning on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.4 2 The Virginia statute does not contain these limitations.43
Justice Hassell interpreted the purpose of § 18.2-423 was to "proscribe
physical acts intended to inflict bodily harm upon the victims of cross burning,
not to suppress repugnant ideas."44 The dissent stated that, "the Virginia
statute does not prohibit the burning of a cross so long as that act is committed
without an intent to place a person in fear of bodily harm." '45 The dissent cited
In re Steven S., a California Court of Appeals decision that upheld a statute
proscribing the act of "burning a cross on the private property of another for
the purpose of terrorizing the owner or occupant or in reckless disregard of
that risk." 46 The California Court of Appeals held that this statute was a
permissible content-based prohibition on speech within the meaning of the
First Amendment.47 The dissent also cited a Washington Supreme Court case,
decided after R.A. V., which also upheld a statute proscribing cross burning that
places another person in reasonable fear of harm to his person or property.
48
The Washington Supreme Court held that this statute did not violate the First
Amendment.49
CONCURRING OPINION
Justice Kinser agreed fully with the majority, but wrote solely to "address
certain inferences and conclusions drawn by the dissent."5 The first issue was
the use of the word intimidation. Justice Kinser found that the "dissent's
attempt to equate an intent to intimidate with a 'true threat' or a physical act
intended to inflict bodily harm, had no legal basis."'" Justice Kinser stated that
the dissent had misconstrued the definition of intimidation as established in
Sutton v. Commonwealth. 2
The opinion also stated that § 18.2-423 does not adhere to the principle
41. Id. at 751.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 753.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. In re Steven S., 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 644, 646 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
47. In re Steven S., 31.Cal. Rptr. 2d at 644.
48. State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993).
49. Talley, 858 P.2d at 217.
50. Black, 533 S.E.2d at 747.
51. Id.
52. Sutton v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 665, 670 (1985).
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established in Brandenburg v. Ohio.53 The Brandenburg Court established that
"the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid speech advocating the use of force or crime and could only be
proscribed if two conditions were satisfied: the advocacy is 'directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action' and the advocacy is also 'likely
to incite or produce such action."' 54 Justice Kinser stated that "the act of
burning a cross with the intent to intimidate is not necessarily speech aimed at
'producing imminent lawless action'," therefore it does not satisfy the
Brandenburg test.55
Finally, Justice Kinser opined that the dissent had misinterpreted the
majority opinion. He wrote that "the dissent's statement that the majority has
concluded that the Constitution of the United States prevents the General
Assembly from enacting a statute that prohibits persons from burning a cross
in a manner that intentionally places citizens in fear of bodily harm" is
inaccurate.56 Justice Kinser stated that a more accurate interpretation of the
majority opinion is "that the General Assembly may, in a statute of neutral
application, proscribe expressive conduct performed with the intent to
intimidate another individual, but that the General Assembly may not
selectively prohibit only certain acts of intimidation based upon the content of
the underlying message. 57
CONCLUSION
Cross burning has been used by the Ku Klux Klan throughout its history
as "a tool for the intimidation and harassment of racial minorities, Catholics,
Jews, Communists, and any other groups hated by the Klan."58 Virginia's
Attorney General, Randolph A. Beales stated that, "Cross burning with the
intent to intimidate is a form of domestic terrorism, which is intolerable in a
free society."59 Dissatisfied with the Virginia Supreme Court's decision, the
state filed a petition for certiorari on January 24, 2002. However, the Virginia
Supreme Court's holding follows the precedent of R.A. V. v. St. Paul so it is
unlikely that the United States Supreme Court would uphold § 18.2-423.
One of the majority's leading arguments for the unconstitutionality of § 18.2-
53. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
54. Bradenburg, 395 U.S. at 444.
55. Black, 553 S.E.2d at 747.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 741.




423 was that the statute was overbroad. The language of the statute makes
the act of burning a cross prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate. Even
if the statute was reworded or amended to exclude the mere act of burning as
prima facie evidence of intent to discriminate the statute would still suffer
from viewpoint discrimination.
Maryland and South Carolina have overturned cross burning statutes
similar to § 18.2-423, while California and Washington have passed similar
cross burning statutes, but the dissent stated that there were significant
differences between the Virginia statute and the Maryland and South Carolina
statutes.60 This narrow 4-3 decision may prompt other states to examine the
language of their statutes more carefully, rather than instantly putting it under
the blanket of R.A. V. v. St. Paul.
Although these cases were consolidated, the situations of these defendants
were very different. Both cases could be tried under different statutes.
Although, Black had permission of the owner to be on her property, the
speeches given at the rally he led could be considered fighting words. A
witness of the rally testified that in the speeches given during the rally one
speaker said that "he would love to take a .30/.30 and just random shoot the
blacks and talked about how they would like to send the blacks and Mexicans
back from where they come from."'" This witness, a Caucasian female
testified that she was "scared" that her home would get burned or that
something would happen to her children.62 Her testimony demonstrates that
racial animus does not only affect its intended targets. Defendants Elliott and
O'Mara can be tried under trespass or arson laws.
New legislation regarding cross burning would have to pass the
Constitutional requirements that § 18.2-423 failed. Virginia's strongest
possibility of protecting its citizens from the type of crime that § 18.2-423
intended to punish is to institute penalty enhancements on arson or trespass if
there is a racial motivation for the crime. The United States Supreme Court
upheld penalty enhancements for an offense where the defendant
"intentionally selects the person against whom the crime is committed because
of the race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or
ancestry of that person" in Wisconsin v. Mitchell.63
An Anti-Hate Crime Law would afford minorities more protection against
acts of violence and intimidation but given Virginia's current legislature such
a law is unlikely to pass. The decision to overturn § 18.2-423 broadens the
60. Id. at 754.
61. Id. at 748.
62. Id. at 749.
63. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476,480(1993).
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First Amendment free speech rights of Virginians. However, Virginia must
now take measures to ensure that the civil rights of its citizens will not suffer
instead.
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